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I.

INTRODUCTION—HOW MUCH DO WE VALUE OUR PROPERTY?

When a victim suffers harm to her property as a result of an injurer’s
negligence, tort law generally requires that the victim be compensated. Under
tort law, there are two primary ways to evaluate harm to property: (1) as relative
to the property’s market value, or (2) in terms of an owner’s subjective value of
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her property. In some instances, these values can be the same. At other times,
however, market value and subjective value can diverge in significant ways.
Most obviously, sentimental attachment can trigger subjective valuation, in
which objects assume a value far exceeding their market price. Additionally,
subjective value can also develop through an owner’s reliance on her property
for certain functions. To illustrate, consider a memory disk for an electronic
camera—the memory disk can be purchased at a relatively cheap price yet may
be worth a fortune to the person who has lost it. Likewise, a laptop’s market
value usually does not capture its high subjective value grounded in the countless
pictures, music, and other important documents saved on the device. In cases
such as these, an owner’s subjective value will appreciate as the property’s
market value depreciates. Understanding how a person values her possessions is
important to determine her future behaviors, which is relevant for any
examination of our current tort system.
However, a fundamental hurdle exists, as information regarding an
individual’s increased valuation is private and only available to a small number
of people, namely the owner and potentially her relatives.1 As a result, evaluating
subjective value can be hard both for the injurer and the courts.2 Unlike market
value, which can be measured relatively easily by an expert’s survey of the
market,3 subjective value requires more information and an element of
speculation by the factfinder. Due to this challenge and absent any reliable way
to independently determine subjective value, the primary mechanism to evaluate
all harm is the market value rule.
In circumstances where the owner places a higher value on her property
than the market does, the owner may invest in precautionary measures to mitigate
the risk of uncompensated harm. When a victim’s subjective value exceeds the
objective compensable harm, then the victim may be inclined to take excessive

1

Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1035 n.30 (1995); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and
Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 137, 141 (2006); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 734–38
(1996); see also Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA.
L. REV. 771, 830–35 (1982) (suggesting that assessing the value of idiosyncratic harm is difficult
in the realm of non-physical torts, pain and suffering, and subjective value of property).
2

See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in
Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 913–15 (1989) (arguing that
non-economic loss is difficult to evaluate). Note that this Article discusses subjective value rather
than non-economic loss. However, the authors’ arguments may also apply to non-economic loss.
3
Levmore, supra note 1, at 834 (“[C]onventional institutional assessment is already
straightforward and does not generate great administrative costs.”).
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precaution.4 For instance, a rational pedestrian presumably values her life and
wellbeing at a superior level than a damage award for medical care or loss of life.
Under this calculus, the victim is incentivized to take more precaution than that
required by law because her additional precautions will lower the risk of
accident. A reduction in the risk of accident will lower the total accident costs
that an injurer-driver would otherwise assume if an accident had occurred. When
the reduction in accident cost is significant enough, these costs will fall below
the driver’s precaution costs. At this point, the driver, as a potential injurer, may
prefer negligent behavior instead of taking precaution. This example illustrates
how excessive precautions by owners resulting from a subjective property value
may incentivize injurers to intentionally behave negligently because they do not
internalize the full accident costs.
The idea that potential injurers will adjust their precaution level based
on their expectations of the victims’ behavior is present in many cases. For
example, in Dahlin v. Lyondell Chemical Co.,5 the defendant, the owner of a
plant holding hazardous materials, failed to warn its employee-driver of the
factory’s hazardous material, arguing that he knew the risk and was expected to
take adequate precautions or should not have engaged in the activity. In a similar
fashion, the court in Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.6
noted that a driver’s failure to take precaution against a cyclist was the result of
the driver’s reliance that the pedestrian would take more precaution once he saw
her headlights. In Munn v. Hotchkiss School,7 the defendant, a high school that
sent its students to a program in China, argued that
even if a school provided no warnings and took no action to
minimize risk, parents would have an obligation to
independently investigate threats to their child’s health, and
their failure to make an independent investigation could be used
as evidence that those parents caused their child’s injuries.
Hotchkiss further asserts that the act of allowing a student to
participate in a school trip is itself an act of parental negligence.8

4

When transaction costs are low, the owner’s best option to protect her property’s subjective
value is to contract with the potential injurer. A contract can capture and accurately price the
potential harm to her property through imposing increased damages. However, contracting may be
precluded because of high transaction costs, especially in torts.
5
No. 3:14-cv-00085-SMR-HCA, 2016 WL 4136769 (S.D. Iowa July 12, 2016), vacated, 881
F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2018).
6
57 So. 2d 767 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
7
8

24 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D. Conn. 2014).
Id. at 186.
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All these cases have several common factual elements. First, the victim is
perceived to value the risk of harm more than the injurer. This intuitive
assumption asserts that the chemical company employee and the pedestrian value
their lives more than the compensation they stood to receive in the case of an
accident. Similarly, the parents valued their children’s lives more than the
compensation for bodily injury of the child. Second, the defendants argued in
these cases that failure to take precaution is justified or excused because the
victim or a third-party failed9 to take more precaution.
In addition to case law, many behavioral studies10 have found that
individuals adjust their risk-taking according to their perception of the risk. For
example, bicyclists operate more safely when they do not have helmets.11 This
trend captures the idea of risk compensation, which is the tendency to respond to
situations of increased risk by taking additional precautions and vice versa.
This Article argues that—as the previous examples demonstrate—subjective
valuation perverts injurers’ incentives to take precautions and thereby
contributes to an outcome of increased injurer negligence. The contribution of
this Article is to advance the economic analysis of torts by understanding how
our legal system’s response to subjective value creates inefficient behavior by
injurers. The existing literature shows that liability rules fail to protect subjective
value. This Article will build on this premise by examining the implications of a
victim’s excessive precautions on injurer behavior. This Article also provides
lawmakers with an understanding of why injurers will intentionally fail to take
efficient precautions when encountering victims with high subjective value and
what possible responses are available.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the various types of
compensation currently available under negligence law in order to discuss when
subjective harm is unrecoverable. Part III reviews the classic economic analysis
of negligence law and the importance of setting the legal standard efficiently in
order to incentivize parties to take adequate precautions. Part IV presents the
basic paradigm for subjective valuation of harm and its effect on incentives. Part
V examines possible responses to realigning injurers’ incentives by investigating
the effects of increasing either damages or the standard of care or both. In light

9
In Munn, the parents are not the victims of the accidents; hence their precaution would be a
third-party precaution. Id. at 189.
10
See generally Aslak Fyhri & Ross O. Phillips, Emotional Reactions to Cycle Helmet Use,
50 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 59 (2013); Tim Gamble & Ian Walker, Wearing a Bicycle
Helmet Can Increase Risk Taking and Sensation Seeking in Adults, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 289 (2016);
Ben Lewis-Evans & Talib Rothengatter, Task Difficulty, Risk, Effort and Comfort in a Simulated
Driving Task—Implications for Risk Allostasis Theory, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
1053 (2009).
11
Fyhri & Phillips, supra note 10; Gamble & Walker, supra note 10.
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of this analysis, Part VI concludes and suggests further implications in a digitized
world.
II.

COMPENSATION IN TORT LAW

In order to understand how uncompensated harm distorts party
incentives, one must first examine the different types of compensation currently
available to victims. The availability of damages, or lack thereof, will affect each
party’s incentives regarding their respective level of precaution.
Compensation for subjective value remains a riddle in tort law. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines value as the “exchange value or the value
to the owner if this is greater than the exchange value.”12 Given this definition,
courts can assess the value of harm by citing to a product’s market value or by
determining its value-to-owner (“VTO”) based on evidence provided by the
plaintiff.13 In terms of market value, there are two approaches the court can take
in attempting to make the plaintiff whole:14 (1) compensate the victim for repair
costs,15 or (2) compensate for replacement costs,16 depending on which amount
is less.17 Under the market value rule, courts and juries appraise the cost of
repairing the property so that it may regain its pre-injury market price or calculate
the cost of obtaining an equivalent property.18 When the victim values the harm
at the market value, the victim enjoys full recovery of her loss. Due to the
certainty and ease with which compensation can be calculated, the market value
rule is the dominant mechanism courts use to determine damages.19
An exception to the market value rule exists when the harmed property
has no market value or maintains a “comparatively small exchange value but

12

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

13

See PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 12–13 (2d ed. 1996).
For a discussion on the “making-whole” doctrine, see id. at 5; IZHAK ENGLARD, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 113 (1993); TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 67–70 (2007) (referring to it as restitutio ad integrum rather than restitutio
in integrum); Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2007).
15
An alternative rule is the Diminished Value Rule, which compensates the victim for the
difference in property value immediately before and after the harm. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL.,
HORNBOOK ON TORTS 856–57 (2d ed. 2016).
14

16

ET AL.,

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 215 (3d ed. 2007); DOBBS
supra note 15; 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 850–56 (2d ed. 1993).

17
The defendant has the right to pay whichever cost is less. Nevertheless, this rule provides
exceptions for certain types of harm, such as pets and family photos. CANE, supra note 13, at
92–93; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 857; 1 DOBBS, supra note 16.
18
1 DOBBS, supra note 16.
19
John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 462 (2006).
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ha[s] a special and greater value to the owner,”20 such as pets21 or specialized
land.22 When confronted with these scenarios, courts instruct juries to assess
damages according to the VTO rule, under which the jury can evaluate the harm
by estimating the perceived value of the object to the particular owner as
informed by the plaintiff’s evidence.23
Although the VTO rule recognizes that an owner’s value may exceed the
market value, this doctrine is consistent in excluding sentimental value from
recovery.24 As such, sentimental value is not typically recognized as a
compensable loss.25 Similarly, emotional distress caused by property loss26 is

20

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See, e.g., Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App. 2004).
22
See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. City of Memphis, 148 S.W. 662 (Tenn. 1912) (noting the special
value of a specific land to a railroad company).
23
For example, in Emerson v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 393 So. 2d 691 (La.
1981), the court ruled that notes of experiments have value to their owner. The court found that
[the plaintiff] lost much more than a 6-inch stack of paper contained in a
portfolio and two notebooks. In effect, he lost the practical benefit of hobby
material which took him over 4 years to develop. He lost the intellectual
gratification that he received from the data as a part of the ongoing research
project. He also lost the ability to draw from his research specific test results,
which the record indicates he did when lecturing and participating in
discussion groups. The data also had the potential for giving plaintiff future
intellectual gratification, since the factor analysis plaintiff contemplated would
have validated or invalidated his hypotheses and given plaintiff more
information upon which he could have formulated new hypotheses. In order to
regain the enjoyment of the hobby of which he is now deprived, plaintiff will
have to assemble the information anew.
Id. at 693 (footnote omitted).
21

24

RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (5th ed. 2003); 1
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FREIDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2019), LexisNexis.
25
In a few jurisdictions, courts have accepted the sentimental value rule, which compensates
the victim for loss of subjective sentimental value. However, this is the rare exception. Texas is an
example of a jurisdiction that explicitly enables plaintiffs to recover sentimental value. The court
in Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963), set the precedent that, for cases
in which the main value of the property is sentiment, such value is recoverable. In Bond v. A.H.
Belo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App. 1980), the court enabled recovery for the sentimental value
of family photos. Nevertheless, the court did reject some sentimental value claims in both
Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. 2013), and Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v.
Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App. 2004). Nevada is another jurisdiction that allowed subjective
value compensation in Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008).
See also Alison M. Rowe, Survey of Damages Measures Recognized in Negligence Cases Involving
Animals, 5 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 249, 254–61 (2012) (reviewing
approaches to compensating for injuries to pets).
26
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. m
(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
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also non-compensable unless it is the direct result of negligent behavior and
accompanies a physical injury.27 For example, a victim-homeowner may recover
some damages for the emotional injury of seeing her generational home burn
down, but will not be compensated for the loss in the sentimental value of her
home.
With this background norm in operation, any harm that depreciates
sentimental value will be uncompensated by common law while other harms may
be compensable either by the market value rule or, in unique circumstances,
under the VTO rule. Given these options, the court’s classification of harm is
significant because VTO may be recoverable but sentimental value is not. Due
to diverging outcomes, courts have tried to differentiate between uncompensated
sentimental value and the VTO doctrine.28 In King Fisher Marine Service, Inc.
v. NP Sunbonnet,29 the court attempted to explain the rationale of awarding
damages as
the choice between awarding mere exchange value and, on rare
and appropriate occasions, “value to the owner” is one of
policy—not of ineluctable accounting. Logic compels neither.
But where one who has arrived at a bargain of unique value to
him is deprived of it by the fault of another, and where he can
convince the trial court that its value to him was real and not
speculative or later devised, he should recover it. Whether or not
he can do so on any given occasion is for the trial court.30
As explained in this decision, the VTO rule generally activates when the victim
can provide the court with convincing and concrete evidence of her property
valuation. Courts exercise their power to create judicial policy when assigning

27
MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 161–67 (2008); Kenneth S. Abraham, The
Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1212–14 (2001); Ariel Porat, Misalignments in
Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 93–94 (2011); Siewert D. Lindenbergh & Peter P.M. van Kippersluis,
Non Pecuniary Losses, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 215, 215–27 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
28
In United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2012), the court argued
that value-to-owner can be assessed using a rational method. The court in Kopelowitz v. BPF
Associates, No. A-1124-13T4, 2015 WL 1419497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 31, 2015),
allowed an assessment of value-to-owner for lost data but precluded any sentimental value. In
determining the value of a lost pet, the court in McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 566–67
(Ct. App. 2009), contended that under value-to-owner doctrine it would take into account the
“pedigree, reputation, age, health, and ability to win dog shows,” but not the loss of companionship
as this is a sentimental harm. See also Barking Hound Vill., L.L.C. v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191
(Ga. 2016). The Supreme Court in a takings case excluded “peculiar” value to the owner for
recovery. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945).
29
30

729 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 316.
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VTO damages because this remedy allows them to achieve a desired outcome.
In other words, courts order VTO damages when the victim can prove her higher
valuation and the court believes an elevated damage award will serve an
appropriate public policy purpose. For example, in Jankoski v. Preiser Animal
Hospital, Ltd.,31 the court found VTO damages appropriate for an injury to a pet,
emphasizing that “[t]he concept of actual value to the owner may include some
element of sentimental value in order to avoid limiting the plaintiff to merely
nominal damages. It appears clear that damages in such cases, while not merely
nominal, are severely circumscribed.”32
The court’s concern with policy implications reveals the importance of
external considerations when determining what type of harm should be
compensated. To illustrate, assume that Allie owns a garden with a $1,000
market value. Allie’s garden is generational, and she is sentimentally attached to
it. Allie would only consider selling her garden for a minimum of $3,000. Bob is
a factory owner whose factory is adjacent to Allie’s garden. In the process of
production, Bob’s factory emits a certain toxin that harms the plants in Allie’s
garden. Under market value compensation, Bob must pay Allie $1,000 for a new
garden, and to the extent that Allie’s excess valuation is sentimental, it will not
be recoverable. On the other hand, Allie’s excessive value may be compensable
under the VTO rule if Allie can show a unique value to the owner which is not
sentimental. In this case, Bob would pay Allie $3,000. This wide difference in
damage awards highlights the significance of the court’s classification of Allie’s
subjective value because it will inform each party’s decision regarding what level
of precautions to take. With efficiency as the goal, Allie and Bob will take
precautions that fit the cost they may incur. If Allie will be forced to internalize
$2,000 of uncompensated loss, she will increase her precaution. Conversely, if
Bob is liable for all $3,000, he will likely increase his precaution in the face of
increased accident costs.
As seen through this example, subjective value compensation will
impact party incentives, as both the injurer and the victim will adjust their
behavior based on anticipated accident costs. However, VTO is a rare victory for
the victim, and as such, courts overwhelmingly rely on market value to determine
damages and only use VTO when unable to apply the market value rule.33 As

31

510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).

32

Id. at 1087.
33
See generally Trs. of the Univ. of the D.C. v. Vossoughi, 963 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2009); Carye
v. Boca Raton Hotel & Club, Ltd. P’ship, 676 So.2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Burgess v.
Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006); Bernhardt v. Ingham Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 641 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Oster v. Kribs Ford, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Lane v. Oil Delivery, Inc., 524 A.2d 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); William
F. Freeman, Inc. v. Alderman Photo Co., 365 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Merritt v.
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/5

8

Shiman: Perverting Incentives When the Priceless Is Not Compensable: Vict

2019]

PERVERTING INCENTIVES

455

seen with Allie and Bob, market value will cause the former to engage in more
precautions to keep her garden safe from substantial harm, leaving the latter to
benefit from a reduced incident of harm. This Article will explain how market
value compensation may actually incentivize rational injurers to take inefficient
precaution, even when they internalize the full accident costs because they rely
on the victim’s excessive precautions to reduce the probability of an accident
occurring. In light of this phenomenon, common law may instead reach
efficiency not by prohibiting subjective value compensation, but by enabling
victims to recover their subjective value.
It is important to note that this Article refers to uncompensated harm as
subjective value and not as sentimental value or VTO because in many cases this
distinction is vague and artificial. Employing the term “subjective value” aims
to capture all uncompensated harm that exists in excess of market value or VTO,
whichever is applicable.
III. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NEGLIGENCE LAW
Cognizant that market value loss is compensable while subjective value
is not, the next step is to examine the repercussions of this principle, which
requires an understanding of efficient legal standards. The economic analysis of
torts is grounded in the notion that parties will minimize their total costs, where
costs are usually measured in monetary terms. Understanding this motivation
will provide the foundation needed to discern the subjective valuation analysis
contained later in Part IV.
A. Accident Costs and Efficient Precaution
The economic analysis of torts contends that tort law’s objective is to
reach social efficiency by minimizing accident costs.34 The costs of accidents are
calculated as the sum of the expected harm from the accident35 plus any
precautions taken by the parties. To achieve optimal accident costs,36 the victim
and the injurer should take efficient precautions. A party takes efficient

34
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 189–90 (6th ed. 2012) (defining the
economic essence of tort law); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 7 (1987)
(suggesting the social goal is “minimization of the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident
losses”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (“[T]he dominant
function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least
approximately, the efficient—the cost-justified—level of accidents and safety.” (citation omitted)).
35
The expected harm of the accident equals the probability that the accident will occur
multiplied by the harm the accident will inflict.
36
THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 43 (2004).
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precaution when his or her marginal precaution costs equal the marginal
reduction in expected harm.
B. Using the Tort System to Achieve Efficiency
A negligence rule demands a certain level of care from a potential injurer
toward a potential victim. When an injurer fails to comply with the standard of
care, he is liable for the accident costs that result. Law aims to achieve efficiency
by creating incentives for parties to take efficient precautions. Efficient
precautions are taken when the law prices inefficient care at a higher price.37 In
other words, the law must assure that the price of inefficient care is greater than
the cost for efficient precaution.
Negligence law creates efficient incentives when it aligns the standard
of care with efficient precaution,38 which can be attained when one
reconceptualizes the Hand Formula into marginal terms. A defendant fails to
satisfy the standard of care and is negligent when the marginal cost of increasing
his precaution is less than the reduction in the expected harm, or when untaken
precautions would be efficient.39 To illustrate, assume again that Allie values her
garden at the $1,000 market value. If factory owner Bob is liable for the garden’s
market value, then the efficient standard of care requires Bob to take efficient
precaution against a risk of $1,000. Assume that the risk of accident is 40%, and
by taking precaution worth $150, Bob can reduce that risk by half to 20%. In
taking the $150 precaution, Bob escapes liability for all harm caused to Allie’s
garden.40 Bob’s payoffs are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Injurer’s Payoff Under Efficient Standard of Care

No precaution
Precaution

Bob
-$400

Allie
$0

-$150

-$200

37
ROBERT COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING TORTS,
CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 17–25 (2014); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1523 (1984).
38
See supra Section III.A.
39
See Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799,
801–03 (1983); Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
40
This example assumes that Allie cannot take precautions or, alternatively, she is not required
to take precautions because the precautions are not efficient.
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Table 1 exemplifies how the injurer will prefer efficient precaution to
negligence when the law operates seamlessly.41 The law incentivizes injurers,
like Bob, to take efficient precaution by making the injurer internalize the harm
he causes negligently. In theory, setting the legal standard to the efficient
precaution creates a price discontinuity, which makes violations of the legal
standard prohibitively expensive.42 Put differently, the efficient standard of care
values violations at a higher price than non-compliance to create a gap between
the cost of compliance versus the cost of violation. Under these conditions, a
rational individual will always try to comply with the standard. For example, in
Table 1, the law prices violation of the standard of care at $400 (the accident
costs), when the cost of compliance is only $150.
When one party fails to internalize part of the negative externality
associated with his or her behavior, however, then this party is less incentivized
to behave efficiently.43 To portray this concept, consider State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,44 a seminal Supreme Court case
regarding punitive damages. Here, the defendant-driver negligently caused an
automobile accident where one person died and another was severely injured.45
Sued for negligent driving, the defendant was represented by his insurance
company, which refused to settle the case for $50,000—the limit of the
defendant’s insurance policy—and insisted on taking the case to trial.46 In
choosing to pursue litigation, the insurance company assured the defendant that
there was no danger to his assets.47 Unfortunately, the court ruled against the
defendant and awarded damages greatly exceeding $50,000.48 After the ruling,
the insurance company refused to cover the defendant’s additional liability.49 The
court responded by sanctioning the insurance company with high punitive
damages for its decision to insist on taking the case to trial even though there
was a high likelihood of receiving a judgment in excess of the policy limit.50
Examining the facts of Campbell, the insurer had the option of pursing
risky litigation or agreeing to a settlement. Because the offered settlement of

41

This is because Bob will only lose $150 if he takes precaution compared to $400 if he
decides not to. Based on his cost-maximizing objective, Bob will always prefer taking precaution.
42
COOTER & PORAT, supra note 37, at 17–25; Cooter, supra note 37.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 34, at 189–90.
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
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$50,000 reflected the defendant’s policy limit, the only benefit the insurance
company stood to gain in settling was saving litigation costs. On the other hand,
in taking the case to court, the insurance company could potentially escape all
liability and be left to pay only the litigation costs. A problem arose because the
defendant’s subjective value of the lawsuit was much higher than $50,000
because any adverse ruling would make the defendant personally liable for the
damages in excess of the policy limit. And indeed, the court ruled that the
defendant was liable for $185,849.51 This case provides a revealing example
where the the policyholder and the the insurer held different valuations of the
harm. The policy limit enabled the insurer to externalize the cost associated with
an adverse verdict by shifting this burden to the policyholder. With most of the
litigation risk externalized, the rational insurer was incentivized to engage in
riskier conduct by choosing litigation over settlement.52
In the following Part IV, the paradigm examines the injurer’s incentives
when the victim’s subjective value is uncompensated, with a particular focus on
changes in precaution levels when the latter is the only party internalizing the
subjective value. Before proceeding to this analysis, one must first examine the
efficiency challenges that emerge within an imperfect legal system, which
includes the current tort system. Recognizing this situation is significant because
the basic paradigm will reveal how subjective valuation creates problems even
when operating within a perfect legal system. The fact that subjective valuation
triggers problems in a perfect legal system means that such issues are only further
exaggerated in the current, imperfect system.
C. The Imperfections of an Efficient Legal Standard
The basic paradigm will highlight how excessive victim precautions
because of subjective value triggers a range of problems currently undiscussed
by scholarly literature. The paradigm operates in a perfect legal system, which is
not the case in reality. In our imperfect legal system tribunal mistakes, flawed
standards, judgment-proofness, and excessive precautions all benefit the
negligent injurer. Cognizant that such problems emerge within a perfect legal
system, their impact is magnified in an imperfect system. The following
discussion reviews the current factors that scholars have cited to explain

51

Id. at 413.
One can think about Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981), as
an example of the public’s extreme dislike of corporations that engage in a cost-benefit analysis
over individuals’ lives and interests. In this case, Ford allegedly failed to invest in fuel tank
replacements because Ford believed the cost of this endeavor exceeded the calculated harm to
human life. Id. at 790. However, it has been argued that this case’s notoriety results merely from a
misunderstanding of the facts. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).
52
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suboptimal injurer behavior. This Article presents subjective valuation as an
additional obstacle within this existing structure.
First, the likelihood of being found negligent can be minimal because
courts often make mistakes in setting the boundaries of liability. These errors by
the tribunal need to be consistent and not random in order to impact party
incentives. When courts systematically set the standard of care too low, the
injurer has the incentive to reduce his level of care because he confidently faces
a lesser threat of liability.53
Second, the court’s inaccuracy in computing damages can also lead to a
distortion in party incentives. When the court consistently makes a mistake by
assessing harm too low, then the injurer is incentivized to lower his precautions
because he will not be responsible for the total accident costs. Escaping this
burden prevents injurers from internalizing the full value of the harm.54
Third, the value of harm caused by violations to the standard of care may
be inherently low, thereby causing victims to commit more resources to litigation
than they are likely to recover from the injurers.55 This in turn will incentivize
victims to avoid litigating their injury and internalize the costs. The injurers, on
the other hand, will enjoy the benefit of not complying with the standard of care
without paying the costs of noncompliance. This rational apathy by victims
generates a collective action problem, which can be partially mitigated through
legal mechanisms that entitle plaintiffs to some compensation in excess of their
harm.56
Fourth, an injurer can be judgment-proof,57 meaning he cannot
practically be held accountable for his harm because he does not maintain the
necessary funds to compensate the victim. In this way, the resources available to
a judgment-proof defendant limit his expected costs. If the expected harm is
capped by the injurer’s resources and amounts to a value lower than the cost of
precaution, then the injurer may engage in tortious behavior when the expected

53

1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 158–61 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 34, at 220–22; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 892 (1998).
54
1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 53, at 164–67; COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 34, at 257–61; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39
J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996); Porat, supra note 27, at 135–36.
55

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 34, at 257–61; Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
56

See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); David Gilo et al., Negligence, Strict Liability, and Collective Action,
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (2013); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709 (2006).
57
Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 607–09
(2006).
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benefit exceeds the potential costs.58 Sometimes, loopholes within the law create
judgment-proof scenarios when injurers can opportunistically exploit the law to
limit their liability.59 In other situations, the law creates judgment-proof injurers
by placing caps on recovery, for example.60
Fifth, courts ignore excessive victim precautions in their calculation of
liability or damages, even though these behaviors lower an accident’s
probability. This scenario—which has been unexamined—provides the core
framework for the paradigm developed below. As will be discussed in the
following section, excessive precautions by victims can significantly impact an
injurer’s behavior calculus by creating more reasons for rational injurers to take
inefficient precautions.61
The preceding five factors explain why injurers do not internalize the
full harm they cause, which subsequently results in an underperformance of the
legal standard. However, such deliberate non-compliance can also arise in a
perfect legal system—where negligence is correctly detected, damages are
adequately assigned, and a victim has no litigation costs—if there is a
judgment-proof injurer or an unaccounted external precaution. The paradigm in
Part IV presents a case where inefficiency occurs in a perfect legal system,
causing injurers to deliberately take inefficient precautions. Given that the
current legal system maintains imperfections, this problem is only magnified.
The following section reviews the current discussion about how failing
to compensate victims for the full extent of their loss may result in inefficiency.
This Article builds on this scholarship by suggesting that a larger inefficient
problem exists because a lack of subjective compensation creates perverse
incentives for victims and negatively impacts injurer behavior.

58
59

Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45–46 (1986).
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14–32 (1996).

60
See generally Amanda Edwards, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages Caps, 43
HARV. J. LEGIS. 213 (2006); David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in
Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009); Greg
Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 143 (2001); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical
Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005).
61

Scholars have examined how precaution can affect total accident costs, such as how one
party’s precaution costs may change other party’s precaution costs, Dhammika Dharmapala &
Sandra A. Hoffmann, Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 240 (2005), or when the injurer fails to internalize the precaution costs of
the victim, Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1211–15
(2001).
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D. The Trouble with Subjective Value
The discussion surrounding damages in traditional law and economic
scholarship assumes that assigning recovery for harm and determining efficient
precaution are synonymous activities, in the sense that the standard of care is
derived from the expected compensable harm.62 However, Ariel Porat identified
instances where the risk used to analyze the duty of care were separate and
independent from the risk used to impose liability and award damages.63 The
particular scenario relevant to our discussion is when the expected costs used in
the Hand Formula to determine the reasonable level of care differ from the actual
resulting injury.
This distinction, which Porat refers to as misalignments,64 describes
various instances where the law refers to different types of risk at various stages
of the tort claim.65 For example, when courts assess the standard of care, they do
so for one type of injury but then may compensate for a different type of injury
in granting damages. Porat argues that “exempting the negligent injurer from

62
Many authors have written about the variation between damages and expected harm in the
context of punitive damages. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 34, at 257–261; Cooter,
supra note 37, at 1543; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 53. For other discussions concerning
incommensurable harm, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994), particularly in the context of tort law. See also Robert Cooter,
Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1097 (2003). However,
both of these discussions never considered the difference between the inflicted harm observed by
the court, provided no mistake is made in assessing damages, and the harm realized by the victim.
For more philosophical discussion on the concept of incommensurability, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Coming
Down to Earth: Why Rights-Based Theories of Tort Can and Must Address Cost-Based Proposals
for Damages Reform, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 479–83 (2006).
63
Porat, supra note 27; see also ENGLARD, supra note 14, at 39–41 (criticizing the Hand
Formula for using the value of actual harm as the value for expected harm).
64
Porat, supra note 27, at 84 (noting misalignments are instances where “the risks that are
accounted for in setting the standard of care are different from the risks for which liability is
imposed and damages are awarded”).
65
Id. For example, when stating the efficient standard of care in a claim regarding lost income
from a car accident, the court should evaluate the efficient precaution against the average harm. In
other words, the court assumes that the reasonable person takes efficient precaution against harm
that could likely result from an accident. However, when computing damages, the court takes the
specific characteristic of the victim into account. In some cases, such as the presence of a
low-income or high-income victim, the risk that actually materialized differs from the risk
computed by the Hand Formula. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 292–96 (2012) (discussing the thin-skull doctrine); Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 21–22 (2000) (discussing the exemption of risk to oneself).
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liability for harms resulting from [ordinary] risks creates a misalignment.”66 This
Article demonstrates that inefficiency may occur when the injurer can foresee
the risk of high subjective value injury and knows that courts will compensate
victims according to the market value rule. Taken together, these factors
essentially exempt the injurer de facto from a foreseeable risk.67 In this way, it is
actually alignment between the standard of care and the injury, which both
exempt subjective value and may be responsible for causing injurers to take
inefficient precautions.68 Part V suggests how misaligning these elements, such
as increasing damages to include subjective value, can potentially solve part of
the inefficiency that results from a liability rule.
A different venue to examine the inefficiency of subjective value is
through the long-studied principle of liability rules. Liability rules, by their
nature, fail to protect a victim’s subjective value when the governing
compensation rule is limited to protecting objective value.69 When the victim’s
subjective value of harm exceeds the court-awarded damages, there is an
uncompensated amount of money. This uncompensated harm is internalized
solely by the victim, and as a result, injurers may be less deterred from engaging
in negligent behavior. On the other hand, victims aware of their vulnerabilities
may respond by taking increased precautions.70 Keith Hylton argues71 that under
a liability rule, victims will be predisposed toward either taking no precaution72
or taking excessive precaution73 to mitigate their exposure to uncompensated

66

Porat, supra note 27, at 125–27.

67

One can argue that subjective value is not foreseeable and hence uncompensated. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. i (AM. LAW.
INST. 2012). For a discussion regarding foreseeability as a restriction on liability, see Tony Honoré,
The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW 72, 90–92 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
68
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223 (9th ed. 2014) (arguing that a
credible tort system demands that the minimal damage award a defendant must pay is equal to the
“L” in the Hand Formula).
69
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (1972).
70
71

Hylton, supra note 1, at 155–56; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 760–62.
Hylton, supra note 1, at 158–59.

72
Victims will take no precaution when the cost of precaution exceeds the value of the
reduction in uncompensated harm.
73
Victims will take excessive precaution when the reduction in excessive harm exceeds the
cost of precaution.
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harm.74 The costs of these behaviors are “demoralization”75 or “denormalization”
costs,76 which are the costs that society internalizes as a result of uncompensated
harm.77 For example, when a burglar breaks into a house, he inflicts a cost on the
victim through property theft or damage. In many criminal cases, the prosecutor
does not aim to compensate the victim for her loss but rather seeks to secure
punishment for the illegal conduct.78 By being vulnerable to uncompensated
harm, the victim is inclined to invest in protective measurements, such as an
alarm system to reduce her exposure to the initial risk. Likewise, when a victim
is compensated, but not in an amount that reflects the actual loss incurred, she is
again inclined to mitigate the risk. The costs associated with reducing the risk by
taking excessive precautions are part of the “denormalization” costs.
Building on Hylton’s conclusion, the failure of liability rules to protect
subjective value coupled with the victim’s incentive to invest in excessive
precautions—resulting in denormalization costs—significantly decreases an
injurer’s accident costs and incentivizes him to behave negligently. This
negligent behavior will increase the denormalization cost beyond the cost of
excessive precaution. This Article examines the case of subjective value in a
negligence claim and explores how the presence of subjective value distorts
incentives in a different way than what has been suggested by Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed79 or Hylton.80 The negative externality of
uncompensated subjective value is two-dimensional, contributing to both
inefficient behavior by victims and injurers. The impact on injurer behavior has
often been overlooked in the academic discussion; however, its examination is
equally important because ultimately it is the injurers who are responsible for the
harm. Only when we understand how a restriction on subjective value
compenasation also leads injurers to adjust their decision-making for the worse
can we appreciate the full scope of this problem. Part IV subsequently presents

74

Most previous debate focuses on the comparison between the benefit of property and
liability rules to protect uncompensated harm. Hylton, supra note 1, at 180–82 (discussing some
measures that can be taken by courts to protect subjective value using tort doctrines such as
recklessness and punitive damages).
75
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–15 (1967).
76
Hylton, supra note 1, at 158–59.
77
Id.; Michelman, supra note 75, at 1214–15; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1774–85 (2004).
78
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
171–73 (1968).
79
80

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69, at 1108.
Hylton, supra note 1, at 158–59.
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the basic paradigm of subjective value victims and their incentives to engage in
over-precautions.
IV. PRECAUTIONS UNDER SUBJECTIVE VALUATION
A. A Paradigm of Excessive Precautions
Let us revisit the interaction between Allie and Bob. In Part III, we saw
that when the legal standard is set efficiently, Bob will take efficient precaution
at the cost of $150 against the risk. However, even if Bob takes precaution, there
is still a 20% chance that an accident will occur. If Allie values her garden
subjectively at $3,000, then her total expected accident cost is $600. Cognizant
of her sizable loss, Allie may be inclined to take more precautions to eliminate
or mitigate her risk. Allie decides to invest $300 to reduce the risk of accident to
5%. How will Bob react to Allie’s additional precaution?
This question grounds the paradigm, which examines each party’s
incentives under a negligence legal regime where a victim’s subjective value of
harm is unrecoverable. The result of this scheme is a distortion of party
incentives to take precautions against the harm. Assuming the legal standard of
care is set efficiently, the injurer may be inclined to take fewer precautions and
will behave negligently because the victim’s excessive precaution lowers his
expected accident costs. Specifically, a victim’s additional precaution decreases
the injurer’s cost of non-compliance with the legal standard of care. The victim’s
excessive precaution as a result of subjective valuation changes the cost of
accident by reducing the probability of the risk materializing. This places the
injurer in a position in which his expected accident costs are lower. When the
expected accident cost for the injurer falls below his precaution costs because of
the victim’s excessive precaution, the injurer will not take precaution and behave
negligently. This outcome may be particularly problematic when the social
optimum requires that both parties take precaution. In this way, subjective
valuation incentivizes a worried victim to take too many precautions to protect
her property, which encourages the injurer to assume less than efficient
precautions because the accident costs are lowered. The following example
attempts to illustrate this principle of how subjective valuation can distort both
parties’ incentives under a negligence rule.
The victim, Allie, now values her garden at $1,000 even though the
market value is only $100. If an injurer, Bob, contaminates the rare flowers in
Allie’s garden, Allie will only be able to recover $100, the market value of her
flowers, if she brings a successful tort claim. An accident will occur with a 100%
probability when both parties fail to take precaution. However, this outcome is
unlikely given that both parties have a superior alternative as demonstrated
below. Therefore, at a minimum, the injurer will take precaution because he will
assume responsibility for the total accident costs if he does not.
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Let us assume that the injurer can take precaution, at a cost of $40, to
reduce the probability of an accident by 50%. Allie can take excessive
precaution81 for a cost of $100, which will reduce the probability of an accident
by an additional 70% of any remaining risk. Cumulatively, once Bob and Allie
take precaution, the probability of an accident occurring drops to 15%
(0.5 × 0.3). The legal standard requires Bob to take precaution because it is
efficient to eliminate $50 in harm by investing $40. Therefore, when Bob does
not take precaution, he is accountable for the accident costs related to the market
value of the garden. Similarly, the law does not require Allie to take precaution
here because it would be inefficient, so the notions of contributory negligence or
comparative negligence do not arise. Table 2 presents the payoffs for each party
with the letters identifying each scenario.
Table 2: The Payoffs Under Subjective Value of Harm
Allie
(Victim)
No Precaution
Bob
(Injurer)

No
Precaution

Precaution

(A)
-$100

(B)
-$900

-$30

(C)
Precaution

-$40

-$370
(D)

-$500

-$40

-$250

When both the victim and the injurer do not take precautions, the
accident will occur. If Bob is negligent, he will pay the full market price for the
garden ($100). Allie will lose her garden (harm which she values at $1,000) and
recover damages ($100) from Bob. The sum of these values results in a total of
-$900 for the victim and is represented by the payoffs in Scenario (A).
When the injurer takes the minimal precautionary measures to satisfy the
negligent standard, he is not liable for accident costs and is only responsible for
his $40 precaution costs. Allie does not have a claim against Bob because he was
not negligent, and therefore she receives no compensation. Here, there is still a
50% chance of an accident occurring, so Allie’s value is -$500 as depicted by
the payoffs in Scenario (C).
Allie, however, can mitigate her losses by taking precautions to reduce
the risk of an accident by 70%. If Bob does not take precautions, but Allie does,

Allie’s precautionary measure is considered “excessive” because it is inefficient to take a
$140 precaution to prevent a harm only worth a $100 market value. Nevertheless, as demonstrated
below, Allie’s “excessive precaution” may become efficient when subjective value is considered.
81
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his payoff is -$30, which is the probability of an accident multiplied by the
damages. Under these payoffs in Scenario (B), Allie pays for her precautions
(-$100), receives damages ($30), and then incurs expected accident costs
(-$300), for a total of -$370.
Finally, when both Bob and Allie take precaution, Bob’s payoff is -$40,
which reflects his precaution cost. On the other hand, Allie’s payoff is the cost
of precaution (-$100) plus the accident cost (0.5 × 0.3 × $1000 = -$150), which
equals -$250 as shown in Scenario (D).
This scenario reveals two important insights for circumstances where a
victim maintains subjective value. First, the victim will always take precaution
because her payoff is consistently superior to her payoff under “no precaution.”
Presumably, the injurer is aware of this fact and therefore will fail to take
precautions because his “no precaution” payoffs exceed his “precaution” payoffs
(for the injurer B > D). Second, when incorporating the subjective value into the
total cost calculus,82 mutual precaution is preferable to unilateral precaution
because total accident costs are lower when both parties take precautions
(because D < B). However, the equilibrium occurs when the injurer does not take
precaution, but the victim does, as is captured by Scenario (B). Given these two
outcomes, a regime that fails to compensate for subjective value has the potential
to create inefficiency even assuming a perfect legal system.
It is important to note that this garden example does not imply that a
social optimum is always present in situations like Scenario (D), where optimal
precaution is bilateral. Rather, in some cases, like Scenario (B), the victim’s
excessive precaution because of subjective valuation actually makes additional
injurer precautions inefficient. In such circumstances, the equilibrium overlaps
with the social optimum. These situations arise when the risk of an accident with
bilateral precaution and the cost of the injurer’s precautions are less than the
accident cost when the victim takes unilateral precaution.83 Interestingly, these

82
The argument for incorporating subjective value into the calculus is, according to the
economic analysis of law, that the goal of tort law is to maximize social welfare. This is done, in
most cases, by minimizing social monetary costs. However, in some distinct cases, the welfare
cannot be conceptualized solely by the monetary value of things, but rather by our valuation of
these things. See Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99, 99–100 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that
the efficiency theory is based on wealth maximization rather than simply objective monetary
values); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 85, 87–88 (1985) (suggesting that individuals’ wealth can be derived from value other than
the monetary value of property or salary); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303 (2007) (arguing that willingness to pay for goods is a measure to
determine welfare one derives from it); see also Levmore, supra note 1, at 833–35 (suggesting that
self-assessment is a vehicle to determine the value of the property to the owner).
83
An intuitive example can be drawn from the garden owner example. There, the victim’s
excessive precaution motivated by subjective value does not just mitigate the risk but eliminates it
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scenarios suggest that when the court imposes market value liability on an injurer
who efficiently fails to take precaution, the effect is purely distributional. Put
differently, whether court finds the injurer liable under (B)-like scenarios, when
this scenario is socially optimal, does not affect the total accident costs but only
impacts how much cost the victim internalizes. In this way, when bilateral
precautions are efficient or when an injurer’s unilateral precaution is efficient,
barring subjective value from recovery may encourage the injurer to take
inefficient precautions. Conversely, when a victim’s unilateral precaution is
efficient, barring subjective value from recovery does not affect efficiency but
only distribution.
A different outcome emerges when the victim realizes she may incur all
the costs of her subjective value but now the injurer’s unilateral precautions are
superior to the victim’s unilateral precautions. In other words, the victim prefers
Scenario (C) over Scenario (B). Revisiting our basic premises, Allie still values
her garden at $1,000 (with a $100 market value), but her precaution costs have
increased from $100 to $300. Bob’s precaution cost is still $40, meaning that any
time he wants to operate his factory he must take $40 in precaution to avoid
liability. The payoffs of the parties with these adjusted numbers are illustrated in
Table 3.

Table 3: Subjective Value Computed—Higher Victim Precaution Cost
Allie
(Victim)
No Precaution
Bob
(Injurer)

No
Precaution

Precaution

(A)
-$100

(B)
-$900

-$30

(C)
Precaution

-$40

-$570
(D)

-$500

-$40

-$450

entirely. When this happens, the payoffs under Scenario (B) would be the lowest (-$100) that
comport with the equilibrium.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5

468

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

In this case, Allie’s preferences are ranked accordingly: (1) Scenario
(D)—bilateral precaution; (2) Scenario (C)—unilateral precaution by Bob; and
(3) Scenario (B)—her own unilateral precaution. Note that even though Allie’s
precaution costs have increased from our first calculation, her expected behavior
remains unchanged in that her best position is always to take precaution. This is
also true in Table 3, where even if Bob fails to take precaution (Scenario (A) or
(B)), Allie is still better off taking precaution (Scenario (B)) because she prefers
losing $570 to $900 (B < A). On the other hand, when Bob takes precaution
(Scenarios (C) and (D)), Allie is better off taking precaution (Scenario (D))
because she will only lose $450 instead of $500 (D < C). Even though Allie’s
preference to take precaution does not change in this calculation, Scenario (B) is
now demoted to the third best outcome when compared with our initial
calculation in Table 2. Taken together, the results generated by the paradigm in
Table 2 and Table 3 suggest that when a victim’s preferred outcome is bilateral
precaution and her least preferred outcome is no precaution, regardless of her
payoffs under either unilateral precaution option, she will always take
precautions because these payoffs are consistently superior.
This conclusion leads to a few important extensions. First, the injurer
does not have to be aware of the victim’s payoff under each scenario. So long as
the injurer knows his own payoffs and the victims’ precaution preferences, the
injurer may choose to behave negligently when the accident costs are sufficiently
low. Second, the standard of care—when set according to the Hand Formula—
guarantees that the injurer will engage in an activity only when the benefits to
him outweigh the associated accidents costs.
To explore this second proposition, when the standard of care is set
efficiently under a market value rule, Bob is better off taking precaution at a cost
of $40 rather than paying $100 in damages. In this case, Bob’s factory will
engage in pollution only if the activity will generate more than $40 in revenue.
Assume that Bob stands to gain $35 from operating his factory and polluting.
Now, the net value of the activity is -$5 and Bob will not take the risk. However,
consider the circumstance where a victim takes excessive precaution because of
her subjective value. In this case, the net value of polluting is positive because
the excessive precautions by Allie reduce the accident costs to $30. With the
benefit from polluting at $35, Bob stands to gain $5.
As seen in this example, excessive victim precaution may encourage
injurers to engage in an activity that they may not have otherwise engaged in
because of reduced accident costs.84 Excessive victim precautions not only

84

The basic paradigm implicitly assumes that a victim’s excessive precaution decreases the
risk of an accident; however, this claim may not always hold true. In some cases, subjective value
and market value are distinguishable, which means precaution can be tailored to prevent the
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increase an injurer’s incentives to partake in potentially harmful activity, but they
also increase the number of injurers participating in any given activity. Instead
of Bob being the only polluting factory, now Cory, David, and Emily will also
operate their factories. As a result, when bilateral precaution (Scenario (D)) is
socially desired, inefficiency may result both on the micro level, between a
specific victim and an injurer, as well as on a macro level, when more injurers
will engage in the activity.
With a more frequent propensity for negligent behavior and an increased
number of negligent players, the result is a higher possibility of accidents.
Whereas a victim’s increased precautions may have protected her property
against the occasional negligent injurer, a more pervasive threat multiplies the
potential for harm. This outcome ignites a cyclical trend where victims may take
even more precautions to drive down the accident cost. In response, injurers will
act in the opposite direction and continue to take fewer precautions. The
increased accident costs resulting from victims’ subjective value are
“denormalization” costs incurred by the legal system.
Given this impact, the basic paradigm builds on the existing literature in
two ways. First, the paradigm shows that the negative externality of excessive
precaution impacts injurers’ payoffs, and second, it creates additional costs.
Furthermore, a review of the paradigm’s calculations also suggests that a
potential injurer possesses sufficient information to decide whether or not to take
precautions, provided he knows his own payoffs and the victim’s precaution
preferences. The following section shows why the insurance industry is unable
to sufficiently address this problem because of industry policy restrictions. As
such, the market cannot adequately mitigate the problems linked with subjective
valuation and will require judicial intervention, later discussed in Part V.

specific harm the victim seeks to avoid. To illustrate, many people value their electronic device at
prices above its market value. This significant subjective value is tied to the important and
sentimental data stored on these devices, such as documents, pictures, emails, music, contact
information, etc. In response to a high subjective value, rational victims will pursue precautionary
measures to secure their property, such as purchasing a protective case or backing up data on a
virtual storage facility. The first safeguard is aimed at securing the electronic device and reducing
the risk of an accident, which can be an excessive or efficient precaution depending on the costs.
The second action does not lessen the possibility of an accident but reduces the risk of suffering
subjective harm if an accident should occur. The type of precaution a victim chooses will have
implications on injurer incentives. When the victim’s precaution only reduces the risk of suffering
the subjective harm, as in data backups, the probability of an accident will not be affected. These
kinds of precautions will not distort the injurer’s incentive, thus leaving the injurer to take efficient
precautions under a perfect legal system and act as if the victim is a market value victim.
Conversely, when the victim’s precaution affects the probability of an accident occurring, the
problem that is discussed in this Part can potentially arise.
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B. Insurance and Subjective Value
The basic paradigm suggests that when victims value the harm to their
property more than its market value, then the injurer may be incentivized to take
inefficient precautions. This results because the victim is inclined to take
precautions against harm that is not compensable. Harm can be compensable in
one of two ways: (1) harm can be recovered from the defendant through damages
or (2) harm can be contractually recovered in an insurance mechanism.85 An
insurance mechanism is impractical for protecting non-compensable subjective
value due to the inherent nature of the insurance industry. Because of an
underlying moral hazard problem, insurance companies do not protect property
above its market value and therefore subjective value becomes uninsurable.86
This structure leads to the reality that when a victim faces a non-compensable
harm to property, she cannot rely on insurance for protection.87
For this reason, a victim’s subjective value that is not recognized by the
VTO rule is neither insurable nor compensable under the torts system. This
limitation means that victims are constrained to personally mitigate future harm
because they cannot recover perfect compensation. Yet, victims cannot always
take sufficient precautions on their own because sometimes the cost of these
precautions is too high. For example, assume that Allie, who is risk neutral, can
take even more precaution that will completely eliminate the risk of accident for
an additional $600. As shown in Table 2, Allie’s accident costs equal $400
(Scenario (B)). It would be inefficient for Allie to engage in $600 precautions
when the risk is substantially lower. Under this circumstance, victims will
increase their precaution up until the marginal cost of their precaution equals the
marginal decrease in the expected subjective harm. This victim behavior results

85

This is unlike non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, which may sometimes be
insured. See Lindenbergh & Kippersluis, supra note 27; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1785 (1995). Note that the insurance for non-pecuniary loss such as pain and suffering is based on
an underlying assumption by insurers that individuals are never willing to risk their well-being for
compensation.
86
POSNER, supra note 68, at 116; SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 228–31. One can think of
replacement costs insurance for a house as an exception to this general rule. Because instead of
repaying the insured the market value of the house, the insurer compensates the insured for
replacing the exact house even when such repair exceeds the value of the house. This exception
may be applicable to repairable things, such as houses or providing medical treatment to pets.
However, this would not enable insurance for irreparable objects.
87
Theoretically, the victim can invest in proving his subjective value to the insurer. When an
insurer can know the subjective value the victim places on the property, then the insurer may be
willing to insure it. Yet, any uncertainty in assessing the sincerity of the victim’s subjective value
will likely result in an insurance denial or in an exorbitant policy premium.
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because of the unavailability of subjective value compensation or insurance for
these harms.
V. INCREASED COMPENSATION VERSUS INCREASED STANDARD OF CARE
Given this undesirable outcome in distorting party incentives, we turn to
examine why increasing compensation is the proper solution when compared to
changing the standard of care. Negligence law is usually a liability rule, in the
sense that it prices violations of the legal standard but does not eliminate them.
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This paradigm suggests that negligence law as a liability rule follows Hylton’s88
assertion and can potentially create inefficiencies, which are magnified by
excessive victim precautions. To combat this problem, the court can impose
harsher sanctions against the injurer,89 which can materialize as either an increase
in damages or an increased standard of care bundled with higher damages. The
decision regarding which outcome is superior will be determined by which
option best aligns the injurer’s incentives with the socially desirable outcome.
A. Increased Damages—Compensating for Subjective Value
Regarding the first course of action, negligence law can create incentives
by changing one of three components: breach of duty, causation, or damages.90
Damages can efficiently solve the problem of subjective valuation when the
average victim values her property at the market price and only a few victims
value their property subjectively higher. If the court computes the standard of
care based on the market price but modifies the damages to cover the subjective
value of the harm, the injurer’s precautions will be efficient. The injurer will take
efficient precaution to avoid excessive liability, and the victim will take efficient
or excessive precaution to mitigate her exposure to uncompensated risk.91 By
adjusting the damage calculation to include subjective value, the courts will force
injurers to internalize the additional cost of the victim’s subjective value. In other
words, increasing damages can address the possibility of injurers taking
advantage of the victim’s excessive precaution, while leaving the decision of
whether or not to take excessive precaution to the victim.
Table 4 illustrates how increasing damages affects Allie and Bob’s
payoffs under this adjusted compensation calculus. As presented in Table 4, Bob
stands to internalize the cost of Allie’s subjective value of -$1,000. As a result,
Bob minimizes his accident costs by complying with the standard of care and
pays $40 in precaution costs. Note that the standard of care is set according to
the garden’s $100 market value and not Allie’s subjective value at $1,000. Put
otherwise, the standard of care and the damages are misaligned because they use
different values.
Table 4: Subjective Value Damages92

88

Hylton, supra note 1, at 158–59.
Table 4 portrays a situation where damages include Allie’s subjective value. Note that the
victim is better off when both parties do not take precaution as shown in Scenario (A). Yet, this
scenario will never occur because the injurer’s “no precaution” payoffs are always inferior to his
“precaution” payoffs. The equilibrium for both parties is captured in Scenario (D). As mentioned
earlier, sometimes (B)-like scenarios are socially optimal when the victim can take unilateral
precautions. In these cases, any change to the standard of care or the damages awarded can
potentially distort efficient incentives. For example, subjective value damages can potentially
92
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Allie
(Victim)
No Precaution
Bob
(Injurer)

No
Precaution

Precaution

(A)
-$1000

(B)
$0

-$300

(C)
Precaution

-$40

-$100
(D)

-$500

-$40

-$250

However, misaligning damages to cover subjective value is not a perfect
solution. First, it does not require injurers to increase their precaution levels
beyond what is desirable against a victim who values her harm at the market
value (“MV victim”). When most victims value their property at a high
subjective value (“SV victim”) and only a few are MV victims, then the rule is
inefficient if the injurer is the cheapest cost avoider.93 For example, assume that
a computer repair shop takes efficient precaution when fixing customers’

cause the injurer to take precaution when it is not socially desirable to do so. When Scenario (C)
is socially optimal, the injurer will always take precautions under increased damages, and the
victim will not. From the injurer’s perspective, the cost of Scenarios (B) and (D) are always
superior under increased damages than Scenarios (A) and (C). In these latter scenarios, when the
precaution costs are higher than the uncompensated harm, the victim will choose no precaution,
which will cause the equilibrium to overlap with the social optimum.
90
Causation is not part of this discussion because we are assuming that there are no mistakes
in the court’s causation determination. Each time a breach of duty results in injury, the defendant
is found liable and pays the market value of the harm.
91

When the expected accident costs are lower than the precaution cost plus the reduction in
harm, the victim will take precaution.
92

Table 4 portrays a situation where damages include Allie’s subjective value. Note that the
victim is better off when both parties do not take precaution as shown in Scenario (A). Yet, this
scenario will never occur because the injurer’s “no precaution” payoffs are always inferior to his
“precaution” payoffs. The equilibrium for both parties is captured in Scenario (D). As mentioned
earlier, sometimes (B)-like scenarios are socially optimal when the victim can take unilateral
precautions. In these cases, any change to the standard of care or the damages awarded can
potentially distort efficient incentives. For example, subjective value damages can potentially
cause the injurer to take precaution when it is not socially desirable to do so. When Scenario (C)
is socially optimal, the injurer will always take precautions under increased damages, and the
victim will not. From the injurer’s perspective, the cost of Scenarios (B) and (D) are always
superior under increased damages than Scenarios (A) and (C). In these latter scenarios, when the
precaution costs are higher than the uncompensated harm, the victim will choose no precaution,
which will cause the equilibrium to overlap with the social optimum.
93
The injurer is the cheapest cost avoider when the injurer can take more efficient precaution.
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computers according to its market value, which may be low for used computers.
Such precautions, however, do not take into account the customers’ subjective
value of their device, which contains photos, documents, data, and other valuable
information.
Second, misaligning damages can incentivize victims to deliberately fail
to protect their own subjective value, when they know they will receive full
subjective value compensation. As Table 4 underscores, Allie’s best outcome
occurs when neither party takes precautions (Scenario (A)). Her payoff under
this circumstance is zero, which is the highest possible payoff from her encounter
with Bob. If the courts applied a rule of increased damages, then Allie will not
be incentivized to take excessive precautions whenever she can predict Bob’s
failure to comply with the standard of care. While inaction may maximize Allie’s
payoff, this outcome is the least desirable scenario because now the victim
exploits the injurer’s position. In order to eliminate opportunistic behavior by
victims that can potentially result in higher social accident costs, a rule of
increased damages for subjective value must incorporate some comparative
negligence element. For example, supporting evidence for subjective value
would be derived from the victim’s level of care. Alternatively, in the context of
comparative negligence, the victim’s standard of care would be derived from her
subjective value and not the property’s market value. In practice, the victim and
the injurer would be required to comply with different standards—namely with
a different “L” in their Hand Formula. For the injurer, L represents the market
value of the harm, while for the victim it encompasses the subjective value.
B. Adjusting the Standard of Care—Protecting Subjective Value
An alternative solution to only increasing damages is to also adjust the
legal standard to incorporate the victim’s subjective valuation. While increasing
the standard of care for the victim may offset opportunistic victim behavior that
arises from subjective valuation. This approach creates problems when the
injurers’ standard of care is also increased because it is derived from the
subjective value of the harm and not the market value of the potential harm.
Developing a uniform level of care from the victim’s subjective value
can be highly impractical. For example, while many people may find their
personal computers, tablets, and cell phones to be highly valuable, it is unlikely
that all potential victims’ value their electronic devices similarly. Thus, any
possibility of establishing a uniform standard would require either depending on
crude averages when compensating victims or engaging in an elaborate
procedure to determine each individual’s respective subjective value. Regarding
the latter approach, this would require different injurers to comply with different
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standards in the same circumstances where the only difference is the victim’s
identity.94
Such an intricate and discretionary strategy will likely lead to efficient
outcomes only when the majority of victims are SV victims and when injurers
are the cheapest cost avoiders.95 If the court uses a marginal Hand Formula that
incorporates subjective value, then the standard of care will rise. This calculus
will demand that the injurer increase his precaution levels compared to those he
would otherwise commit under a calculation based on market value.
Additionally, the opposite dilemma can occur when a victim’s subjective value
is equivalent to the market value.96 Here, the victim may exploit the injurer’s97
increased precaution and fail to take the required precautions demanded by a
bilateral regime.98

94

This theoretically would be similar to the eggshell plaintiff doctrine where different injurers
in the same circumstances would pay different damages because of plaintiff’s subjective
vulnerability. Abraham, supra note 65, at 292–96.
95
The practical assumption, according to the current tort system, is that the standard of care is
objective and, thus, any change to the standard of care will cover most injurers in similar
circumstances. However, theoretically, the standard of care can be derived individually for every
injurer. Recently, it has been argued that personalizing the standard of care is more plausible as a
result of large databases. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016). Ben-Shahar and Porat argue that it is possible and desirable to
personalize the standard of care in accordance with the injurer’s personal traits. Personalizing the
standard of care can work well in subjective value cases when courts can aquire information about
subjective value and injurer’s intent cheaply. Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective
Standards of Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal
Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241 (1989).
96
This analysis assumes that victims do not hold property that is worth less than its market
value. When a property’s subjective value is lower than its market value, it is likely that the
property will be transferred to someone who values it more. As such, for the purpose of this
analysis, there cannot be a subjective value lower than market value. Once incorporating the
transaction costs into our assessment of subjective value, this assumption seems feasible and
follows Ronald Coase’s famous theorem in R. H. Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). I must concede, however, to the argument that victims may stand to gain a net
benefit when they do value their property below market value and only transaction costs preclude
them from selling it. In this case, market value compensation provides victims with a net gain of
the difference between their subjective assessment and the market value. With that being said, there
is no reason to believe that in some sort of system that adopts a bilateral negligence system this
would distort victims’ incentives.
97
Courts should ensure that victims do not engage in opportunistic precautions. Ehud Guttel,
The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, 93 VA. L. REV. 1389 (2007). These precautions
are precautions taken by the victim in order to cast liability upon an injurer that he would not
otherwise incur.
98
This can be eliminated by comparative and contributory negligence regimes. For economic
analysis of comparative negligence, see Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case
for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986); David Haddock & Christopher
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This understanding leads to a novel conclusion about negligence law:
protecting a victim’s subjective value through compensation rules is an efficient
vehicle to incentivize injurers to take precautions against market value harm but
not against subjective value. The reason is that the standard of care is still derived
from the market value of the injury and not from the subjective value.
Compensation rules increase the costs of noncompliance but do not increase the
costs of compliance with the level of care. To the extent that damages include
subjective value, it seems to lead to some desirable results. However, it will not
encourage injurers to protect victims’ subjective value but will instead motivate
them to comply with the standard of care as though they were only to encounter
MV victims. Thus, to effectively increase the standard of care, it must be coupled
with increased damages. Regardless of the efficiency of each mechanism, one
should accept that any viable solution must, at a minimum, increase damages. As
we have seen so far, efficiency justifies increasing damages, and sometimes, in
cases where the majority of the potential victims are SV victims, the standard of
care must also be heightened.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS—BRINGING NEGLIGENCE TO THE
21ST CENTURY
When the victim places a higher subjective value on harm, she might be
inclined to take excessive precaution. When this precaution reduces the
probability of an accident beyond a certain point, the injurer may be better off
facing liability and paying damages than taking precautions since he will not
internalize the subjective value of the harm. Increasing damages to cover
subjective value can incentivize injurers to take efficient precaution when
bilateral precaution is efficient.
Understanding the effects of subjective valuation on the parties’
incentives may not provide us with all the normative answers in every case, but
it offers a partial understanding99of incentives, which can enhance the discourse
around other contemporary questions. Such discussion is particularly important
given the shift in the nature of property as we progress into an increasingly
technological century. First, the risk of harm to property with high subjective
value has changed as valuable virtual property and keepsakes are increasingly

Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985). Under a
comparative negligence regime, when the costs of precaution are greater than the cost of the
victim’s liability for harm, the victim will opportunistically fail to take precaution. Under a
contributory negligence regime, when the costs of precaution are lower than internalizing the entire
accident costs, then the victim will fail to take precaution. When the injurer takes excessive
precaution, this latter outcome is likely to occur.
99
SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 291–97; Richard Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question?
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003).
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fused into one digitalized source. The loss of such data can translate into
substantial harm for the person who has lost it, whether because such data was
never backed-up or because it resulted from a larger technical malfunction. This
change in the way we own and appreciate our property supports changing the
compensation mechanism for losses in a digitized world.
Second, more and more of our personal information is digitized and
stored in clouds, external servers, or databases by service providers. In an
environment of increasing cyber-attacks, we may “incur” certain harm when our
information is compromised by a data breach. However, in various jurisdictions,
courts have found that compromised information does not account as a
compensable harm but rather constitutes a pure economic loss,100 even though
victims may price danger to private information differently.101 In addition,
victims are unlikely to receive damages for emotional distress for cyber torts as
in most cases these damages are very limited.102
Victims may be incentivized to invest more in protecting their digitalized
property by using various preventative measures.103 Such measures may include
anti-virus software, cloud back-ups, firewalls, etc. 104 Similarly, victims may be
inclined to invest in protecting their personal information ex-post. For example,
one whose credit card information has been comprised in the course of a cyberattack may invest in credit monitoring service, which is a service that tracks one

100
For further discussion of data breach and data breach litigation, see David W. Opderbeck,
Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75
MD. L. REV. 935, 943−50 (2016); Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and
Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061
(2009); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 913 (2007). For empirical analysis of data breach litigation, see Sasha Romanosky, David
Hoffman & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 74 (2014).
101
Although compensable harm is zero, subjective harm may still exist. In this way, victims
may be inclined to take precautions against subjective harm whereas the database owners may be
less inclined to do so.
102
See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
S.C. L. REV. 255, 303–05 (2005).
103
See Bernhard A. Koch, Cyber Torts: Something Virtually New?, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 133
(2014).
104
Another venue that we may see developing as a result of the recent trends is a legal
requirement for the victim to back up his personal data. Cloud storage enterprises offer individuals
different services to back up their personal data using a third-party storing server. If courts would
recognize that VTO applies to digitized data and property, it is very likely that this kind of
precaution by victims would become the standard, either as a vehicle to prove that the victim indeed
placed subjective value on the digitized data or, alternatively, when the issue of subjective value
will be trivialized, even as a part of a comparative negligence examination. In other words, backing
up one’s data will be elementary precautions taken by victims, and lack of back up may diminish
the compensation.
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credit card activity and identifies suspicious transactions.105 In other cases, where
the personal information compromised is of an intimate nature, such as personal
pictures, victims may not have a plausible mechanism to increase their
precautions ex-post.
Our digitized era generates more and more scenarios like Allie and Bob,
where the perception of the risk is asymmetrical. Unlike previous rulings on
subjective value, which focused primarily on physical belongings, such as
heirlooms and pets, future subjective value litigation may shift to revolve around
data, digital property, electronic files, records, etc. In this new environment,
reliance on the market value may generate the inefficiencies discussed in this
Article. Additionally, implementing a VTO rule without proper understanding of
victim and injurer incentives may result in random compensation that fails to
efficiently mitigate risks.
Although our current tort system restricts subjective value
compensation, this Article argues that such an approach promotes inefficient
behavior both in terms of injurers and victims. While relevant scholarship has
concentrated on victim behavior, the paradigm presented herein shows how the
scope of the problem is much broader because excessive victim precautions drive
down accident costs and encourage injurers to behave negligently more
frequently and with less apprehension. Although this Article presents a solution
by increasing damage awards to incorporate subjective value, this solution is not
perfect and has its own implications. Nevertheless, this paradigm illuminates a
problem that future scholarship will need to grapple with in order to better align
party incentives to take efficient precaution, which benefits society at large.

105

For further discussion, see Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in
Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113 (2011); Johnson, supra note 102, at
305–11.
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